The Offensive Goalkeeper: Why Liverpool’s Attacking Troubles Stem From their Man Between the Sticks
Liverpool’s recent win over Premier League relegation battler’s, Burnley, evoked mental images of Seth Rogen in “This is the End” trying to paper over the massive crack in his doomsday fortress with duct tape.
While Jurgen Klopp isn’t fighting back the demons of a devilish realm in an attempt to save his life, the aforementioned crack in the fortress can be seen as Liverpool’s perception when facing teams from the bottom half of the table, with Emre Can’s goal being that rather gaunt piece of duct tape.
Despite the positive result, Liverpool failed to score from their more traditional forms of chance creation, something that seems to be somewhat of a reoccurring theme for the Merseyside club against lower fidelity opposition. While some may claim that LFC’s lack of chance creation doesn’t really matter as long as they won, subsequently spouting off some old cliché like “that’s the kind of stuff champions are made of,” the lack of goalscoring from a formulated offensive system is a worry. Twenty-yard screamers from Emre Can, as glorious as they may be, are not a sustainable form of goals.
Joking aside, some may legitimately wonder, why does this matter? Three points are three points. It doesn’t matter how one attains them. Well, in fact, it does. Jurgen Klopp puts it perfectly when referencing Liverpool’s 1–1 draw with Chelsea this season. “I really prefer a draw like this with a good performance, than a three points when I have no idea why we got them.” Klopp has also previously referenced the way he and his management team analyze performances after the fact, often excluding the goals. It’s the idea that the result often does not reflect the performance, and that nine times out of ten, good performances will get you the win. Bad calls, freak goals, uncommon errors and a variety of factors that we can boil down to positive or negative variance, are all things that can have a massive effect on any game. Results are influenced by so much more than the performance each team quantifiably prepared for, suggesting that the result always reflects the better team is wholly wrong.
Albeit, saying Liverpool have had offensive issues is somewhat incorrect. The Reds are one of the highest scoring teams in the Premier League and are consistently associated with the best attacking numbers of the top six. However, as I’ve noted a number of times on various platforms, football, especially modern football, is holistic.
Clearing the Mind
As a tactical analyst, Liverpool’s lack of ability to consistently capture three points against the likes of Burnley, Hull and other sides of a similar ilk seemed to be an open and shut case. I mentioned in my analysis here, Liverpool often struggles against a team that employs a narrow defensive system, limiting the space in central midfield areas and supplying overloads in wide areas; which is correct. What I failed to consider, however, is that they’re still managing to create chances against those teams.
Mike Goodman, an exceptional data analyst and football writer, wrote an excellent piece for ESPN Insider regarding Liverpool’s chance creation and their underlying numbers when it came to lower fidelity opposition. In summary, his conclusion was that LFC creates a similar amount of chances regardless of the opponent. The difference being that they consistently, for lack of a better expression, throw the kitchen sink at the opposition in order to create chances. While creating scoring opportunities against teams that allow LFC space and chances to press seem to come easier, Liverpool are still producing a good amount of chances against the teams that allow little space in behind and force the onus upon the Reds to create. The fallacy within Klopp’s attacking system is that he’s only using one of two ways when trying to break down packed in defenses.
When teams try and break down defensive systems in an efficient manner, the idea is to create space rather than seeking to force your way through. Though there are a few ways to create space against a compact defense, two basic concepts stand out among the rest; holding width, and playing out from the back. Holding width is what Klopp tends to do, and also what tends to lead to his downfall. The idea behind the tactic is simple, push both fullbacks forward in an attempt to stretch the spaces between the defensive block, allowing more space for attacking players to pass, dribble, etc. The idea works in some cases and space can be created. However, when teams cope and still manage to limit space in central areas, nullifying the quantitative advantage Liverpool try to gain, Klopp continues to push forward, putting in crosses, which subsequently exposes his team on the counter.
Playing the ball out from the back is the other tactic teams can use to try and create space against compact systems. The best example of a team that has done so on a consistent basis, in the Premier League at least, is Manchester City. Chelsea also tend to play out very well, but City are the team in England that demonstrably achieve the desired result from this tactic.
The reason for Manchester City’s success with this rather controversial tactic lies with their men under fire, Claudio Bravo, and Willy Caballero. Both goalkeepers are proficient with the ball at their feet, making them an asset in a possession heavy Guardiola system. What many tend to associate with possession at the back is the idea of a buildup. While many pundits and commentators alike claim the use of the tactic is to maintain some idea of ‘sexy football,’ using possession across all parts of the pitch should have some value if used correctly. Pep Guardiola, and other managers that emphasize verticality, such as Marcelo Bielsa, Mauricio Pochettino, and Jorge Sampaoli, use deeper possession as a way to create space in offensive areas.
The main idea behind the concept is that the ball is used in the most efficient way possible. As opposed to forcing through a difficult pass in a crowded area or allowing your possession action to end in a low-quality cross, the ball can be recycled back to the goalkeeper, bringing the defensive block forward, in turn making the space in need of defending larger. Stretching the defensive block by expanding the relevant size of the pitch can then allow offensive players more room in which to directly attack the back four. Playing through the first line of defense over 60 yards is much easier than playing through the first line over 20 yards.
The passing patterns and triangles teams like Guardiola’s practice week in and week out in training are re-created on the pitch, allowing them to play through pressure and create higher fidelity chances at the other end. The usage of the tactic can also limit the amount of players required to break down opposition defenses, thus making the possession team more solid in defense. Crosses have been shown to be ineffective when it comes to creating high-quality chances in non-counter attacking situations, and can actually expose the crossing team on the counter when their attack undoubtedly fails.
The image provided gives us a visual of how frequently Manchester City use their goalkeeper, with each line representing five passes and the thickness of that line representing even more. The best example of positive usage of backfield possession is the third graphic, a visualization of City’s possession against high pressers, Huddersfield. Bravo’s relationship with Aleix Garcia allowed City to bypass their high press and enjoy space in the final third.
Above are data visualizations for Liverpool in matches where they could’ve used their goalkeeper to create space. The lack of passes to and from the goalkeeper are worrying, and it’s a sentiment that is further reflected in some base stats.
City goalkeepers reign supreme in their passing statistics and distribution accuracy, but what is perhaps more telling is the Liverpool keeper passing relationships with their defenders in comparison with City’s keepers and defenders. Though it’s often difficult to visually quantify the tactical movements and intentions of any team through pure data, it becomes evident through these graphics that City are using their defenders, along with their goalkeeper, to push and pull the opponent through Guardiola’s positional play. While it isn’t a requirement for Klopp to delve into the complex tactical ideas explored so explicitly by Guardiola’s teams, utilizing some aspect of their possession ideas may prove beneficial towards achieving consistency against lesser sides.
Though it’s easy to sit here from an outside view looking in, nitpicking at the various fallacies that may be readily apparent from our perspective, the implementation of more holistic passing tactics serves to benefit Klopp being that he hasn’t done much to bring said style to Liverpool. Whether it be Karius or Mignolet, the German’s iteration of the Reds could aid themselves in their quest to achieve the level of success the club is so clearly looking to arrive at by adding this dimension of possession football.
As Klopp spends more and more time with the talented group of individuals at his disposal, we’re seeing more and more of a parallel between this giant killing Liverpool side and the exuberant former Mainz manager’s best ever Dortmund team. The duality of a side that could both decimate opponents on and off the ball is and has shown to be, the recipe for palpable success, it’s a matter of whether he can implement those final nuances and realize his squad’s full potential.
